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WHEN THE ENDS DO NOT JUSTIFY THE
MEANS: THE APPLICATION OF
STATISTICAL SAMPLING TO DETERMINE
LIABILITY IN FALSE CLAIMS ACT CASES
CHRISTINA VLAHOS†
INTRODUCTION
The False Claims Act serves as the primary tool for the
federal government’s recovery of funds that were fraudulently
disbursed under national security and defense contracts,
entitlement programs, federally insured loans and mortgages,
transportation and research grants, and agricultural supports.1
In 2013, the Department of Justice recovered $3.8 billion under
the False Claims Act,2 and in 2014, that number soared to almost
$6 billion.3
For the last five years, the federal government has recovered
$2 billion a year under health care fraud claims alone.4 These
cases originate when health care companies submit false claims
to the federal government for reimbursement under such
programs as Medicare, Medicaid, and TRICARE.5 Defendants
include major corporations like Johnson & Johnson, Omnicare,

†
Notes & Comments Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2017, St.
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1
Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Justice Department
Recovers Nearly $6 Billion from False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2014 (Nov.
20,
2014),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-nearly-6billion-false-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2014.
2
Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Justice Department
Recovers $3.8 Billion from False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2013 (Dec. 20,
2013),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-38-billion-falseclaims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2013.
3
Department of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, supra note 1.
4
Id.
5
Id.
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and Community Health Systems, Inc.6
For example, in
September of 2015, KMART Corp. was compelled to pay $1.4
million to the federal government when it unlawfully
incentivized Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries to fill their
prescriptions at KMART pharmacies.7
Along with enabling the federal government to recover
billions of dollars from major corporations and government
contractors, the False Claims Act has enabled the federal
government to prosecute individuals like Farid Fata, a
hematologist-oncologist who administered chemotherapy and
cancer treatments to hundreds of healthy patients whom he
intentionally misdiagnosed.8 Not only did he administer those
treatments to perfectly healthy individuals, but he also had those
patients undergo many more sessions of treatment than even a
cancer-afflicted patient would need.9 His intention was to submit
claims for those treatments for reimbursement from government
programs.10
The False Claims Act is clearly a useful and important tool
for the federal government to recover funds that were,
essentially, wrongfully disbursed to meritless claimants. The
Justice Department should enforce the False Claims Act even
more extensively against companies and individuals like Dr. Fata

6
Id. Johnson & Johnson paid $1.1 billion in a settlement over False Claims Act
allegations regarding several of its prescription drugs. Id. Omnicare also settled for
$116 million, as a result of its violations of the Anti-Kickback Statute, which falls
under the broader umbrella of the False Claims Act. Id. Community Health Systems
is “the nation’s largest operator of acute care hospitals,” and the company was
required to pay $98.15 million for claims submitted for unnecessary inpatient
treatments that should have been provided at lower cost elsewhere. Id.
7
KMART Corp. Pays $1.4 Million To Resolve False Claims Act Allegations in
Connection with Drug Manufacturer Coupons, Gas Discounts, BUFF. REFLEX (Sept.
3, 2015, 10:30 AM), http://buffaloreflex.com/news/kmart-corp-pays-million-to-resolvefalse-claims-act-allegations/article_710d9f34-511b-11e5-812b-df823731a52f.html.
8
Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Detroit Area Doctor
Sentenced to 45 Years in Prison for Providing Medically Unnecessary Chemotherapy
to Patients (July 10, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/detroit-area-doctorsentenced-45-years-prison-providing-medically-unnecessary-chemotherapy.
9
Id.
10
Id. Following Fata’s sentencing, Assistant Attorney General Leslie R.
Caldwell explained, “Time and again, Dr. Fata callously violated his patients’ trust
as he used false cancer diagnoses and unwarranted and dangerous treatments as
tools to steal millions of dollars from Medicare, even stooping to profit from the last
days of some patients’ lives.” Id. Fata engaged in such practices “to increase his
billings to Medicare . . . . [He] then submitted fraudulent claims to Medicare . . . for
these unnecessary treatments.” Id.
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who engage in unlawful practices in the interest of accumulating
more wealth at the expense of the federal government and
American taxpayers. Citizens would be better protected from
further exploitation, both monetary—as their tax dollars are first
spent on false claims, then further expended by the government
through its attempts to recover those stolen tax dollars, thereby
multiplying the adverse effect by diverting those funds from
other uses—and personal, like Dr. Fata’s patients, whose
collective health was exploited for his gain.
Several courts have recently made it easier to successfully
bring claims under the False Claims Act. In cases where
defendants have allegedly submitted thousands of false claims to
the federal government for reimbursement, rather than
presenting proof of each claim’s falsity, as is typically required,11
a court in the Eastern District of Tennessee recently permitted,
instead, the submission of a sampling of claims.12 Based on the
analysis of liability in that sample, that court extrapolated
liability to the remainder of the alleged false claims.13
While the federal government has a compelling interest in
recovering as much of those fraudulently disbursed funds as
possible, especially in cases where the defendants are acting with
such ignoble intent as Dr. Fata, the federal government’s
recovery should not come at the price of the defendants’ Due
Process rights under the Fifth Amendment. By permitting
statistical sampling to determine liability, the courts lower the
burden of proof for liability in False Claims Act cases, essentially
bypassing pleading requirements and finding fraud without
granting the defendants an opportunity to defend themselves.
Thus, this Note argues that the use of statistical sampling to
determine liability in False Claims Act cases constitutes a
violation of a defendant’s constitutional right to Due Process
under the Fifth Amendment. Part I of this Note provides some
historical context for the False Claims Act and discusses its
contemporary application as a tool for the federal government to
recover funds that were disbursed to fraudulent claimants. Part
11
Roger S. Goldman et al., Fourth Circuit May Address Use of Statistical
Sampling in False Claims Act Actions, LATHAM & WATKINS: CLIENT ALERT 1 (July
21,
2015),
https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/lw-statistical-sampling-falseclaims-act.
12
United States ex rel. Martin v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., Nos. 1:08-cv-251,
1:12-cv-64, 2014 WL 4816006, at *19 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 29, 2014).
13
Id.
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II examines earlier False Claims Act cases in which statistical
sampling was assessed as a tool for evidentiary analysis. It also
examines a recent False Claims Act trial in which the presiding
judge held that extrapolation for a statistical sample was
sufficient to prove liability, notwithstanding many years of
precedent holding otherwise. Part III argues that, on balance,
even though the federal government has a strong interest in
enforcing the False Claims Act and recovering government funds,
statistical sampling fails to provide adequate procedural due
process to defendants. This methodology deprives defendants of
their Seventh Amendment rights, fails to adhere to civil
litigation pleading requirements, and defies accepted standards
of proof for liability.
I.
A.

FALSE CLAIMS ACT IN CONTEXT

History of the False Claims Act

Since its initial passage in 1863 in the wake of the Civil War,
the False Claims Act continues to be among the most effective
enforcement tools employed by the federal government to combat
the fraudulent taking of public funds.14 The Unions spent vast
amounts of money to sustain its army’s efforts against the
Confederacy, and a substantial portion of the population enlisted
in the armed forces.15 But, as Representative Fortney Stark
explained during his remarks on the Congressional Record in
1985 regarding amendments to the False Claims Act,
opportunists “appeared who sold shoddy, dangerous, or worthless
merchandise. There were military men who extorted contractors
or took kickbacks and gratuities from contractors, and politicians
who participated in . . . uncontrolled spending.”16
In consequence of such exploitation—which included, among
many other fraudulently and poorly executed contracts, the sale
of blind and diseased mules that were “unfit for the service, and
almost worthless” to the federal government, rather than
artillery horses and cavalry horses—the False Claims Act was

14
Frank LaSalle, Comment, The Civil False Claims Act: The Need for a
Heightened Burden of Proof as a Prerequisite for Forfeiture, 28 AKRON L. REV. 497,
497 (1995).
15
131 CONG. REC. 1,636-01 (1985) (statement of Rep. Stark).
16
Id.
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conceived.17 The 37th Congress appointed a special committee to
“inquire into all the facts and circumstances connected with
contracts and agreements by or with the [g]overnment growing
out of its operations in suppressing the rebellion.”18 The statute,
which provided that “any person who knowingly submitted false
claims to the government was liable for double the government’s
damages plus a penalty of $2,000 for each false claim,”19 saved
the federal government millions of dollars after its enactment.20
B.

Initiating False Claims Act Litigation

A False Claims Act case may be initiated in several different
ways: the Attorney General may file suit in district court;
attorneys working on behalf of the country’s nearly one hundred
U.S. Attorney’s Offices may file suit; alternatively, as stated
above, a “private person[]” may file his own suit on behalf of the
federal government, in what is called a qui tam action.21 This
private person, who is called a “relator,” may act on any
incentive, even just for personal gain.22 Still, the result is that
fraud is brought to the federal government’s attention, and
17

Id.
Id.
19
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT: A PRIMER (2011), www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/civil/legacy/2011/04/22/C-FRAUDS_FCA_Primer.pdf.
20
131 CONG. REC. 1,636-01 (1985) (statement of Rep. Stark). The False Claims
Act has continued to serve as a useful tool for the federal government:
[The False Claims Act] is intended to protect the treasury against the
hungry and unscrupulous host that encompasses it on every side, and
should be construed accordingly. It was passed upon the theory . . . that one
of the least expensive and most effective means of preventing frauds on the
treasury is to make the perpetrators of them liable to actions by private
persons acting . . . under the strong stimulus of personal ill will or the hope
of gain. Prosecutions conducted by such means compare with the ordinary
methods as the enterprising privateer does to the slow-going public vessel.
James B. Helmer, Jr., False Claims Act: Incentivizing Integrity for 150 Years for
Rogues, Privateers, Parasites and Patriots, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1261, 1267 (2013)
(alteration in original).
21
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 19; Helmer, supra note 20, at 1267 (citing
United States v. Griswold, 24 F. 361, 366 (D. Or. 1885)).
22
The qui tam relator may receive up to twenty-five percent of the damages
awarded at the end of a False Claims Act suit. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) (2012). Qui
tam actions are initiated when nongovernment agents bring claims on behalf of the
government. By initiating this action, the qui tam “relator” is generally able to share
in the Government’s recovery. Qui tam comes from qui tam pro domino rege quam
pro si ipso in hac parte sequitur, meaning “[w]ho sues on behalf of the king as well as
for himself.” Helmer, supra note 20, at 1262 (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1251
(6th ed. 1990)).
18
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funds, which would not otherwise have been recovered, are
recovered. This has allowed perpetrators of fraud against the
government to be found and brought to trial in ways that are
otherwise impossible considering the Justice Department’s
limited capital and human resources.
C.

Contemporary Amendments to the False Claims Act

Since its initial passage, the False Claims Act has been
amended a number of times.23 The federal government now
collects treble damages at trial, rather than just double
damages.24
Additionally, certain steps have been taken to expedite
plaintiffs’ efforts in bringing False Claims Act cases. For
instance, one amendment that was made to the False Claims Act
was the modification of the defendant’s requisite state of mind—
it was reduced from a “knowing” to a “recklessness” standard.25
Another amendment that has facilitated recovery through the
False Claims Act is the reduction of the standard for the burden
of proof. In 1986, Congress adopted the preponderance of
evidence standard, replacing the clear and convincing evidence
standard.26 Consequently, plaintiffs are more likely to achieve
success in bringing a False Claims Act case now than they were
previously.27
The features of this law, from the qui tam provisions
allowing nongovernment actors to bring cases on behalf of the
government, to the modification of the proof standard, are
indicative of a commitment on behalf of Congress to enable the
federal government to recover as much money as it can when the
government has been wrongfully deceived into paying fraudulent
claims.
D. Elements of a False Claims Act Cause of Action
Though the False Claims Act is applied to a wide variety of
fraudulently submitted claims to the federal government,
whether it is a health care fraud claim or fraudulent

23
24
25
26
27

DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 19.
Id.
31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2012).
LaSalle, supra note 14, at 500–01.
Id. at 501.
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disbursements under a military contract, the following are the
“requisite elements” that plaintiffs must prove when any False
Claims Act case proceeds to trial:
(1) a [defendant] presents, or causes to be presented, a claim for
payment or approval; (2) the claim is false or fraudulent; and
(3) the [defendant’s] acts are undertaken “knowingly,” i.e., with
actual knowledge of the information, or with deliberate
ignorance or reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the
claim.28

To prove the falsity of the information, the plaintiff must
establish that the claim “involves an incorrect description of
goods or services provided or a request for reimbursement for
goods or services never provided.”29 However, False Claims Act
cases rarely go to trial.30
Moving forward towards litigation, given the publicity and
potential damages that may accompany a trial, is unfavorable for
defendants,31 but the pleading and proof standards imposed at
trial are also fairly difficult for plaintiffs to satisfy. To determine
whether claims submitted to the federal government by
defendants are fraudulent, either the government or plaintiffrelators must prove liability for each individual false claim
asserted. For instance, in United States ex rel. Bunk v. Gosselin
World Wide Moving, N.V., the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit, deciding a False Claims Act case, “[treated]
each of the 9,136 claims as a discrete basis for liability.”32 One
can imagine the time and resources that would be required to
28
United States v. Robinson, No. 13-cv-27-GFVT, 2015 WL 1479396, at *4 (E.D.
Ky. Mar. 31, 2015) (quoting United States ex rel. Bledsoe v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc.,
501 F.3d 493, 503 (6th Cir. 2007)); see also United States v. Villaspring Health Care
Ctr., Inc., No. 3:11-43-DCR, 2011 WL 6337455, at *4–5 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 19, 2011).
29
United States v. Fadul, No. DKC 11-0385, 2013 WL 781614, at *7 (D. Md.
Feb. 28, 2013) (quoting Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 697 (2d Cir. 2001)).
30
It is worth noting that when False Claims Act cases actually proceed to trial,
the federal government is able to recover more money than it would at settlement,
as treble damages are accounted for in the final judgment, whereas they are not
accounted for generally at settlements. See 2014 Year–End False Claims Act Update,
GIBSON DUNN 5, 11 (Jan. 7, 2015), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/
documents/2014-Year-End-False-Claims-Act-Update.pdf. Moreover, an unfavorable
verdict for defendants in a False Claims Act case can result in such punitive
measures as the cancellation of government contracts with those companies,
institutions, or individuals who failed to comply with the statute. Id. at 11.
31
See id. (regarding repercussions of False Claims Act verdicts for defendants).
32
See United States ex rel. Bunk v. Gosselin World Wide Moving, N.V., 741 F.3d
390, 401 (4th Cir. 2013).
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effectively review each of the 9,136 claims to determine whether
each element of a False Claims Act cause of action is satisfied. It
would require so much time, and so many resources, in fact, that
some courts have begun to reconsider the evidentiary mandate
imposed on plaintiffs in such False Claims Act cases. An
alternative means of determining liability, which purports to
save both time and resources, is statistical sampling.
II. SAMPLING IN FALSE CLAIMS ACT CASES
“Sampling is a technique which selects a representative
portion . . . of the relevant universe of items and, using the
results obtained in this sample, makes inferences about unknown
quantities of interest in the relevant universe.”33 Statistical
sampling has already proven to be a useful tool in class action
cases, mass tort cases, and other areas of mass litigation.34
Sampling allows parties to a trial to avoid the “fishing
expeditions” and exorbitant costs of discovery in cases where
there are thousands of claims.35 Still, the use of statistical
sampling as a means of determining liability in False Claims Act
cases would dramatically “change . . . the landscape of litigating
and defending False Claims Act cases.”36 The use of statistical
sampling would, controversially, permit plaintiffs in False
Claims Act cases to circumvent standard procedure, and instead
of presenting the “claim-by-claim proof typically required in
highly fact-dependent civil cases,”37 plaintiffs could simply
present either an arbitrarily selected or, worse still, intentionally
selected, nonrepresentative cross section of claims and, based on
the information extracted from a sample, find that the defendant
is liable for the aggregated claims.
33
Expert Report on Data Processing, Sample Selection and Proposed
Estimation Methodology of Constantin T. Yiannoutsos, Ph.D. at 2, United States v.
Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., No. 112CV00064, 2014 WL 7778494 (E.D. Tenn. Mar.
21, 2014).
34
Charles Yablon & Nick Landsman-Roos, Discovery About Discovery: Sampling
Practice and the Resolution of Discovery Disputes in an Age of Ever-Increasing
Information, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 719, 722–23 (2012). Sampling was even
“expressly” approved as a discovery procedure for e-discovery disputes in the 2006
revisions to the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2)(B). Id.
35
Id. at 725–26.
36
Chris Haney, Extrapolating False Claims: The Debate in U.S. v. Life Care,
LAW360 (Oct. 7, 2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/579373/extrapolating-falseclaims-the-debate-in-us-v-life-care.
37
Goldman, supra note 11.
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False Claims Act Cases in Which Statistical Sampling Was
Rejected

It appears that courts resolving False Claims Act cases have
generally been unreceptive to parties who proffer statistics
rather than hard, concrete evidence.38 Rendering a judgment of
liability on the basis of probabilities and projections, rather than
undergoing a claim-by-claim examination at trial, is still an
uncommon practice in most courthouses and one with which
judges seem to be uncomfortable.39
Traditionally, even in cases where there are thousands of
false claims, courts have rejected statistical sampling if it is
possible to examine each claim individually to determine its
falsity.40 For instance, in United States v. Friedman, where the
defendant had his patients unnecessarily hospitalized in order to
file reimbursable claims with Medicare, the United States
District Court for the District of Massachusetts rejected the
government’s attempt to employ random sampling of more than
fifty percent of the defendant’s alleged 676 violations of the False
Claims Act.41 The sample had been subjected to review, and was
found to support medical documentation produced by the
defendant and the relevant hospitals.42 However, the presiding
judge declined to consider that statistical evidence.43 The final
judgment rested on the findings that forty-two separate claims
were indeed violations of the False Claims Act, and the court

38
See, e.g., United States ex rel. Crews v. NCS Healthcare of Ill., Inc., 460 F.3d
853, 856 (7th Cir. 2006); see also United States ex rel. El-Amin v. George Wash.
Univ., 533 F. Supp. 2d 12, 31 n.9 (D.D.C. 2008).
39
Judge Mazzone explained his rationale for rejecting the opportunity to
extrapolate liability based on a sample:
While I recognize the validity of the mathematical and statistical
projections based on a review of a smaller number of claims I have declined
to extrapolate in the manner urged by the government. My declination is
based on the existence at trial of discrete claims which were analyzed and
discussed and subjected to cross examination. I was able therefore to
review each claim in reaching my conclusions. While I am mindful of the
government's efforts to shorten the trial and present its evidence efficiently
and clearly, I am reluctant to accept a statistical sampling as the basis for
doubling the alleged overpayment without the same scrutiny and support.
United States v. Friedman, No. 86-0610-MA, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21496, at *9 n.1
(D. Mass. July 23, 1993).
40
Id.
41
Id. at *2, *9 n.1, *16–17.
42
Id. at *6–8.
43
Id. at *5–9 n.1.
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arrived at this finding because each claim was “analyzed and
discussed and subjected to cross examination” at trial.44
However, the court declined the opportunity to extrapolate that
finding of liability to the remaining claims; so long as the
individual analysis of each claim was not impossible or utterly
impracticable, the judge was reluctant to extrapolate a certain
amount of liability based on the results of that statistical
analysis.45
The reticence on the part of judges to render judgments on
the basis of sampling is clearly perceptible in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit case, United States ex
rel. Crews.46 In Crews, the relator brought a qui tam complaint
against a pharmacy where she was previously employed,
subsequent to the employees of that pharmacy pleading guilty to
offenses under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.47 The relator
alleged that the pharmacy, which resold medications after
patients returned their unfinished prescriptions, submitted false
claims by reselling medication, which had already been paid for
once, to people who were covered by Medicaid.48 However,
instead of presenting evidence of individual instances where
medications that were paid for once by Medicaid were returned
and resold, and paid for again by Medicaid, the relator presented
“basic math.”49 Her claim was that:
[The pharmacy] provided prescription medication to nursing
home residents, 60% of whom were on Medicaid. Furthermore,
10% to 20% of the dispensed medications were returned unused
by the patients. Therefore . . . “basic math prove[d] that 6% to
12% of recycled drugs would have been [re]distributed to
Medicaid recipients [and thus rebilled . . . ].”50

The relator’s failure to provide actual proof of false claims—
that is, her failure to identify individual claims that were
definitively falsely filed, and instead speculating, and presenting
calculated probabilities—resulted in summary judgment for the
defendant.51
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51

Id. at *9 n.1.
Id.
460 F.3d 853 (7th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 855.
Id. at 856.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 858.
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Similarly, in United States ex rel. El-Amin v. George
Washington University,52 the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia responded to a motion in limine by rejecting
the submission of claims of which relators did not have “personal
knowledge.”53 The relators claimed that the George Washington
University hospital received “thousands, if not millions, of
[federal] dollars” as reimbursement for anesthesia treatments,
which the hospital claimed were conducted by anesthesiologists,
though they were actually conducted by CRNAs or residents,
which would have been considerably less expensive for patients
covered by Medicare.54 Demonstrating their disinclination to
determine liability on the basis of percentages and
extrapolations, rather than firsthand information and concrete,
reviewable evidence, the court instead required the claimants to
plead each claim individually,55 or at least, to “identify the exact
Medicare claims that were allegedly false.”56 Moreover, for each
claim, the relators were instructed to provide “the date the claim
was filed with Medicare, the name of the attending
anesthesiologist, the type of the medical procedure involved and
the amount of the claim.”57 The court demanded this specificity
of fact because the plaintiffs asserted that the defendants
engaged in a regular practice of submitting false claims for
reimbursement of procedures that were only conducted by
CRNAs. However, there was doubt as to the uniformity of this
practice and as to the circumstances surrounding the submission
of each of those claims for reimbursement.58 Principally, the
claims were insufficiently similar and so could not be analyzed in
the aggregate and, instead, required individualized inquiries.59
The relators’ failure to provide the requested information hardly
strengthened their assertion that there were thousands of falsely
submitted Medicare claims.60

52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

533 F. Supp. 2d 12 (D.D.C. 2008).
Id. at 31.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 31 n.9.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 31 n.9.
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Judges have also felt that the potential for error in statistical
analysis is another consideration that precludes them from
allowing statistical data to be submitted as proof of fraudulent
activity by the defendants. This was the case in United States ex
rel. Trim v. McKean.61 There, the United States District Court
for the Western District of Oklahoma did not allow the use of a
statistical sample as evidence of false claims; in particular, the
court did not accept extrapolation from that data sample as
evidence of false claims.62 The sample was deemed too small in
size, and the claims were not sufficiently uniform.63 The claims
included in the sample were neither “consistent” nor
“predictable,” and therefore were “not a reliable or accurate
representation of all [the] claims.”64 When the sample is not
comprised of relatively uniform claims, showing uniform patterns
and uniform claim amounts, the claims are necessarily not
subject to the fact-specific analysis they ought to be undergoing.
Furthermore, the likelihood that the outcome of the statistical
analysis will be accurate is quite low.65
Finally, in the District of Columbia District Court case,
United States ex rel. Hockett v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare
Corp.,66 the relators had ample opportunity to examine each
individual claim. Consequently, their presentation of statistical
sampling as an alternative to examining each claim individually
was rejected.67 Thus, the court would not accept inferences by
the relators that there were certain patterns of behavior that the
defendant engaged in, thereby violating the False Claims Act.68
Instead, the court mandated the production of “real evidence to
support [each] contention.”69 The relators had access to the
relevant records for each false claim that they alleged.70 It was
61

31 F. Supp. 2d 1308 (W.D. Okla. 1998).
Id. at 1314.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
498 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 2007).
67
Id. at 65–66.
68
Id. at 66.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 65 (“Relator has had access to the records of the 66 patients at issue. No
attempt has been made to review each of those records to determine if impropriety
can be gleaned from them. Likewise, there has been no concerted effort, through
discovery aimed at records keepers or caregivers, to pin down the who, what, and
when of the alleged false claims.”).
62

FINAL_VLAHOS

2016]

2/14/2017 11:02 PM

APPLICATION OF STATISTICAL SAMPLING

825

certainly feasible for the relators to review these records, and the
discovery of the “who, what, and when of the alleged false
claims,” was no insurmountable feat.71 The relators’ failure to
specifically plead each false claim, when that evidence was
readily available to them, resulted in the court’s rejection of
statistical sampling in that case.72
These cases demonstrate that judges are typically guided by
the public’s interest in both ensuring accurate outcomes and
protecting defendants’ procedural due process rights. Courts
have been unwilling to permit statistical sampling so long as the
claims are concrete and information is sufficiently accessible,
such that individual review of each claim is feasible.
Additionally, where there has been reason to believe that the
results of the statistical sampling would not be representative of
the population of claims sampled, or they would otherwise be
inaccurate, courts have rejected the use of statistical sampling.
B.

Defining the Parameters of Statistical Sampling’s Limited
Application Prior to 2014

Despite courts’ wariness of statistical sampling, there are
indeed limited circumstances in which courts have allowed the
use of statistical sampling during False Claims Act litigations.
One line of precedent demonstrates courts’ willingness to permit
sampling for the determination of damages.73 Another line of
cases demonstrates that, in very limited circumstances and
within a closed universe of specific facts, there may be mitigating
factors that enable a court to permit statistical sampling, while
avoiding the possibility of depriving defendants of their due
process rights. Subsequent courts have chosen not to broaden
the scope of such usage of statistical sampling, or have otherwise
found that those rulings were very fact specific and
circumstantial, and therefore not more broadly applicable.

71

Id. at 65.
Id. at 66, 70. The relator failed to “point to a single specific false claim or a
sufficiently detailed description of one.” Id. at 71 (quoting United States ex rel.
Aflatooni v. Kitsap Physicians Serv., 314 F.3d 995, 997 (9th Cir. 2002)) (internal
quotation mark omitted).
73
See False Claims Act—Proof of Liability—Eastern District of Tennessee Rules
that Statistical Extrapolation May Suffice to Prove Liability, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2074,
2078 (2015) [hereinafter False Claims Act—Proof of Liability].
72
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Statistical Sampling for the Determination of Damages

The use of statistical sampling to measure damages in False
Claims Act cases is a “long-standing” practice, and “relatively
uncontroversial”—it is not challenged on due process grounds.74
In United States v. Cabrera-Diaz,75 the United States District
Court for the District of Puerto Rico allowed a sample, which had
been selected by the government for an audit of the defendant’s
claims for reimbursement for anesthesia services he provided, to
be used to determine just how many of the submitted claims were
false.76 The results of this audit, which examined the operating
reports, anesthesia records, and nurse notes relating to the
claims included in the sample,77 were then extrapolated to the
entire quantity of claims submitted by the defendant to
determine an estimate of the amount overpaid to the defendant
by Medicare.78 These findings were used to determine the
measure of damages to be awarded to the government.79 The
court, in line with earlier holdings, held that statistical sampling
was acceptable when its function was limited to the
determination of damages.80
Similarly, in United States v. Rogan,81 the Seventh Circuit
concluded that statistical sampling was acceptable to determine
the measure of damages where the manager of a healthcare
company was engaged in a kickback scheme—patients were
referred to a particular medical center and kickbacks were
disbursed.82 There were 1,812 claims in question; the defendant
argued that “the district judge had to address each of the 1,812
claim forms,” to prove that there were patients who did indeed
receive treatment at the medical center that qualified for
74

Jeanne A. Markey & Raymond M. Sarola, 4th Circ. FCA Statistical Sampling
Case Is One To Watch, LAW360 (Oct. 8, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/
712001/4th-circ-fca-statistical-sampling-case-is-one-to-watch.
75
106 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D.P.R. 2000).
76
Id. at 237, 242.
77
Id. at 240.
78
Id. at 237.
79
Id. at 242.
80
Id. at 240 (“Numerous cases involving Medicaid and Medicare overpayments
have endorsed proof of damages through the use of statistics and statistical
sampling . . . . [T]he Ninth and Second Circuits rejected plaintiffs’ due process
challenges to the use of statistical extrapolation from a sample to calculate the
amount of Medicaid overpayments.”).
81
517 F.3d 449 (7th Cir. 2008).
82
Id. at 451–52.
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reimbursement.83 But this argument was rejected as “a formula
for paralysis,” by the Seventh Circuit, which held instead that
“[s]tatistical analysis should suffice.”84 Statistical analysis was
sufficient for the determination of damages because it was nearly
impossible to find information regarding each individual claim to
clearly prove that each one was fraudulently submitted.85
The use of statistical sampling and extrapolation was again
approved to determine damages in a 2013 District of Maryland
case, United States v. Fadul.86 There, the defendant was a doctor
who had allegedly submitted false claims for reimbursement by
Medicare, essentially “double dipping”87 and receiving payments
for more procedures than were rendered. The government
supplied an analysis of statistically valid random samples and
found that the procedure in question for which reimbursement
was sought, retroperitoneal ultrasounds, were not medically
necessary, if they were even performed at all.88 Ultimately, the
court found that the use of sampling was allowable because the
relevant medical records for all 551 claims alleged were difficult
to obtain,89 and because the extrapolation method was “the
soundest measure of damages.”90
Courts have long distinguished the evidentiary standards for
liability from the evidentiary standards for damages. In fact, the
United States Supreme Court reinforced this principle in Story
83
Id. at 453 (“Nor does Rogan get any mileage from the argument that
Edgewater’s records do not ‘rule out’ the possibility that the four physicians provided
some medical services.”).
84
Id. at 453. At trial, in the Northern District of Illinois, the court had treated
each claim as an individual basis for determining the monetary penalty:
Each knowing submission of a false or fraudulent claim is a separate
violation of the False Claims Act. Thus, the number of violations of the
False Claims Act depends on the number of false or fraudulent claims or
other requests for payments that defendant caused to be submitted. A
penalty is assessed per false claim.
United States v. Rogan, 459 F. Supp. 2d 692, 720 (N.D. Ill. 2006), aff’d, 517 F.3d 449
(7th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit determined that it was unimportant that the patients may have received
medical care meriting reimbursement, and instead accepted a statistical analysis—
“the entire amount that [the defendant] received on these 1,812 claims must be paid
back.” Rogan, 517 F.3d at 453.
85
Id.
86
No. DKC 11-0385, 2013 WL 781614 (D. Md. Feb. 28, 2013).
87
Id. at *2.
88
Id. at *3.
89
Id. at *14.
90
Id.
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Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co.,91 holding:
“[T]here is a clear distinction between the measure of proof
necessary to establish the fact that petitioner had sustained some
damage, and the measure of proof necessary to enable the jury to
fix the amount.”92 When parties have reached the stage in the
trial where they are debating damages, the defendant has
already been deemed culpable, following the court’s stringent
review of the alleged claims. Because the defendant has already
been found culpable, the defendant must accept the consequences
of its actions, including the consequence that the court will
determine the damages based on statistical analyses and
approximations.93 It is acceptable for the defendant to suffer the
negative consequences of the application of statistical sampling
to the determination of damages because the defendant has been
found liable.94 This same reasoning clearly cannot be applied to a
defendant at any earlier stage in the proceeding; the court should
not modify or weaken the procedures that are in place during any
stage at trial where the defendant has not yet been found liable.
2.

Statistical Sampling’s Application upon Waiver of
Defendant’s Procedural Due Process Rights

Though statistical sampling is generally proposed by the
plaintiffs—at the objection of defendants—who hope to complete
their evidentiary analysis more efficiently, there are occasions
when sampling has been accepted by the defendants. In such
instances, the defendant’s express consent to sampling preempts
any concerns regarding procedural due process, as they waive
their right to more stringent review.
For instance, in 2010, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit conceded in United States v. Chen that the use
of statistical sampling to determine liability in a False Claims
Act case involving a healthcare provider was allowable when the
defendant submitted that the sampling was representative of all
claims.95 The jury found the defendant liable for submitting
3,544 false claims to Medicare for reimbursement, although only
37 claims had been reviewed in depth as part of the federal
91
92
93
94
95

282 U.S. 555 (1931).
Id. at 562.
False Claims Act—Proof of Liability, supra note 73, at 2078.
Id. at 2079.
402 F. App’x 185, 188 (9th Cir. 2010).
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government’s investigation.96 The Ninth Circuit held that the
review of only 37 claims in a case involving over 3,000 claims was
allowable because the defendant himself conceded that each of
the 3,544 claims were filed under similar circumstances and
conformed to a certain pattern.97
By effectively granting
permission to complete a statistical analysis rather than
individual analyses, the defendant waives the procedural
requirement of determining liability on an individual basis for
each claim.
Another instance in which sampling was permitted with the
permission of both parties is United States v. Krizek,98 in the
District Court for the District of Columbia. There, the defendant
billed more than twenty-four hours in a day and submitted those
billings for reimbursement by the federal government.99 Upon
the agreement of both parties, the court reviewed a sampling of
only 200 claims, rather than examining all 8,002 reimbursement
claims alleged.100 “The fact that there was some liability was a
foregone conclusion, and the nature of the case meant that ‘[a]
determination of liability on the issue of improper coding would
be equally applicable to all other claims.’ ”101 The parties’ mutual
decision to forego analysis of each individual claim led to the use
of a sampling technique.
In most cases, where the court harbored concern that the
individual claims were too fact specific for sampling, sampling
was rejected altogether. However, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana was able to find an
acceptable compromise in In re Vioxx Products Liability
Litigation.102 A “Special Master” completed a report in which he
evaluated all 30,000 claims, and completed an individual
valuation for each unique claim. For the claims that bore
overwhelmingly similar characteristics, the court allowed the
96

Id. at 188–89.
Id.
98
192 F.3d 1024 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
99
Id. at 1025.
100
United States v. Krizek, 111 F.3d 934, 940–41 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
101
United States ex rel. Hockett v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 498 F.
Supp. 2d 25, 66 (D.D.C. 2007) (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting
United States v. Krizek, 859 F. Supp. 5, at *7 (D.D.C. 1994)).
102
See generally 239 F.R.D. 450 (E.D. La. 2006 Nov. 21, 2006); see also Paul
Trapani, In re Vioxx Products Liability Litigation: Circumventing Due Process
Concerns by Allowing Individualization in Sampling Procedures, 82 TUL. L. REV.
2517, 2518 (2008).
97
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claimant to present an analysis of a statistical sample as
evidence, rather than examining each of the claims separately.103
For the remaining claims, the “Special Master” performed
individualized fact-specific analyses.104 In so doing, the court was
able to “lessen[] the burden of discovery upon the parties,”
without “circumventing a party’s burden of proof.”105
When defendants effectively waive their rights to individual
trials of law and fact on each of the claims alleged against them,
the court is justified in skipping procedural steps that may
otherwise be required for the sake of due process.106 Consent to
particular methods of sampling further allows the plaintiffs and
the court to utilize procedures and tools that would otherwise be
unavailable to them.107
3.

The Use of Statistical Sampling to Overcome a Motion for
Summary Judgment

The use of statistical sampling has also been accepted at
earlier stages of trial, before the time arises for a final
determination of liability on the part of the defendants.
Sampling has been judged an adequate source of evidence to
overcome the hurdle of defeating a motion for summary
judgment.
For example, in the recent Eastern District of Kentucky case,
United States v. Robinson,108 the court determined that the
information extracted from a statistical sample was sufficient to
overcome the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.109 The
defendant in that case argued that the plaintiff’s use of an
expert, who examined a sample of thirty claims out of 25,000
alleged claims, was “an insufficient method to prove the ‘falsity’
of any individual claim in this case,”110 but the court ignored this
argument, holding that the statistical analysis performed by the

103

Trapani, supra note 102, at 2523.
Id. at 2527.
105
Id. at 2529.
106
Robert G. Bone, Statistical Adjudication: Rights, Justice, and Utility in a
World of Process Scarcity, 46 VAND. L. REV. 561, 622 (1993).
107
Id. at 623.
108
No. 13-cv-27-GFVT, 2015 WL 1479396 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 31, 2015).
109
Id. at *11. “For purposes of summary judgment, however, the United States
as the non-moving party only needs to ‘set forth specific facts showing there is a
genuine issue for trial.’ ” Id. at *6 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)).
110
Id.
104
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plaintiff’s expert was sufficient to present a “genuine issue of a
material fact,” for the purpose of defeating a motion for summary
judgment.111 The court wrote that even though the plaintiff’s
expert “may not have proved definitively that each of the over
25,000 claims at issue were unreasonable or unnecessary, such
proof is unnecessary at this stage of litigation.”112 Therefore,
statistical sampling appears to have been deemed acceptable at
the summary judgment stage of a proceeding, because it
establishes a genuine issue of material fact that merits
consideration at trial. Nonetheless, this opinion provides no
indication as to whether statistical sampling would be accepted
as evidence for the trial stage of a case. The court did not
respond to the defendant’s argument regarding the burden of
proving each individual claim’s falsity.
The use of statistical sampling has thus been permitted,
albeit in very limited circumstances, with great caution. Courts
have demonstrated neither a readiness to allow plaintiffs to
effectively skip several steps in the proof-gathering process at
trial, nor a willingness to sacrifice diligence and fact-specific
analysis for the sake of efficiency.
4.

Breaking Ranks with Precedent—U.S. ex rel. Martin v. Life
Care Centers of America, Inc.113

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Tennessee recently departed from the strong precedent rejecting
the use of statistical sampling to determine liability in False
Claims Act cases.114 In that case, United States ex rel. Martin v.
Life Care Centers of America, Inc., the court considered the
admissibility of expert testimony promoting the use of statistical
sampling to determine liability in a False Claims Act case
involving Life Care Centers’ submission of false claims for
reimbursement by Medicare and TRICARE.115

111

Id. at *6.
Id.
113
Nos. 1:08-cv-251, 1:12-cv-64, 2014 WL 4816006 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 29, 2014).
114
See supra text accompanying notes 38–39, for discussion of False Claims Act
cases in which statistical sampling was rejected.
115
Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 2014 WL 4816006, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 29,
2014).
112
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In United States ex rel Martin v. Life Care, the court was
presented with 154,621 claims under the False Claims Act.116
The government hired an expert witness, Dr. Constantin
Yiannoutsos, a professor of Biostatistics at the Indiana
University Department of Medicine.117 Dr. Yiannoutsos was
contracted to provide his expert statistical analysis; using a
three-step process, he arrived at an estimation of the number of
alleged claims, which were, in fact, for noncovered services—that
is, falsely filed claims which were reimbursed by the federal
government—and an estimation of the loss the government
incurred as a result of those claims.118
First, at the government’s prompting, Dr. Yiannoutsos
selected a sample of claims—400 out of the alleged 154,621.119
Next, he conducted “a medical review of the records related to the
claims contained in the sample admissions.”120 Finally, he
scrutinized the results of his analysis and arrived at an estimate
of the total number of claims that were actually falsely filed.121
The results of this statistical analysis were offered by the
plaintiffs as evidence in support of their charge that the
defendants violated the False Claims Act.
The defendants, Life Care Centers of America, Inc.,
challenged the admissibility of Dr. Yiannoutsos’s report for a
number of reasons.
Stefan Boedeker, the expert for the
defendants, asserted that Dr. Yiannoutsos’s methodology would
“ultimately yield an arbitrary, non-representative, and invalid
selection of facilities that will be part of the sampling universe
while the rest of the facilities will be ignored.”122 Despite
Boedeker’s claims that Dr. Yiannoutsos’s methodology was
“flawed,” primarily with regards to the selection of his sample,123
though also with regards to the particular form of statistical

116

Id. at *5.
Id. at *4.
118
Id. at *6.
119
Id. at *5–6.
120
Id. at *6.
121
Id.
122
Id. at *8 (citing Expert Report by Stefan Boedeker of Stefan Boedeker,
United States ex rel. Martin v. Life Care Centers of America, Inc., No. 1:08-CV00251, 2014 WL 4816006 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 14, 2013) (2013 WL 12066076)
[hereinafter Expert Report of Boedeker].
123
Id. at *9.
117
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analysis Dr. Yiannoutsos applied,124 the Eastern District of
Tennessee still held that Dr. Yiannoutsos’s testimony was
admissible.125
To arrive at this finding, the court applied the Daubert
test.126 In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,127 the
United States Supreme Court held that under the Federal Rules
of Evidence, a trial judge is charged with the responsibility of
“ensuring that” expert testimony “both rests on a reliable
foundation” and “is relevant to the task at hand.”128 Further, the
Court stated that “[p]ertinent evidence based on scientifically
valid principles will satisfy those demands.”129 The following
factors must be satisfied before expert testimony may be deemed
worthy of admission:
[(]1) whether the expert’s scientific technique or theory can be,
or has been, tested; [(]2) whether the technique or theory has
been subject to peer review and publication; [(]3) the known or
potential rate of error of the technique or theory when applied;
[(]4) the existence and maintenance of standards and controls;
and [(]5) whether the technique or theory has been generally
accepted in the scientific community.130

While these factors are essential to the court’s determination of
the acceptability of the proffered scientific evidence, the Supreme

124
Id. at *12. Boedeker claimed that a “probe sample” would have been a
preferable alternative to Dr. Yiannoutsos’s stratification technique and use of
simulations. Id. Boedeker explained in his Expert Report:
In statistical sampling applications involving very complex populations in
which there is insufficient knowledge about the variation in the underlying
data, it is absolutely necessary to perform a pilot or probe sample. A pilot
or probe sample is a statistically valid random sample on a smaller scale
which is then used to assess the variation in the population and to
calculate the sample size necessary to achieve a desired (or required) level
of confidence and precision such that the extrapolations to the entire
universe will be accurate and reliable.
Expert Report of Boedeker, supra note 122.
125
Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 2014 WL 4816006, at *19.
126
Id. at *10. In Daubert, the Supreme Court adjudicated a case in which two
minors brought suit against Merrell Dow, claiming they suffered limb reduction
birth defects because their mothers had taken Bendectin, a drug prescribed for
morning sickness to about 17.5 million pregnant women in the US between 1957–
1982. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 579 (1993).
127
509 U.S. 579.
128
Id. at 597.
129
Id.
130
Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 2014 WL 4816006, at *2 (citing United States v.
Beverly, 369 F.3d 516, 528 (6th Cir. 2004)).
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Court also iterated in the Daubert opinion that the procedure and
methodology must be the focus of such determination, not “the
conclusions that they generate.”131 Moreover, the party who
introduces this expert testimony in support of their position
bears the burden of proving that these criteria have been met.132
Applying this test, the Eastern District of Tennessee concluded
that Dr. Yiannoutsos’s testimony sufficiently satisfied the
pertinent standards.133 Consequently, the court held that the
Government’s proffered expert testimony—in particular, Dr.
Yiannoutsos’s statistical sampling, analysis, and extrapolation
was an acceptable basis for determining liability in a False
Claims Act case.
As such, the Eastern District of Tennessee rejected the
defendants’ arguments that statistical sampling was
inappropriate in the context of False Claims Act cases, including
their assertions that: (1) the False Claims Act requires “proof of a
false claim for payment,” and “individualized proof as to every
claim”; (2) that the United States must demonstrate that the
defendant had the “knowledge with respect to the details of each
individual claim”; (3) extrapolation is an inappropriate
methodology to measure the falsity of claims allegedly submitted
to the government; and (4) sampling and extrapolation “violate”
the defendant’s “due process rights under the Fifth
Amendment.”134
The Eastern District of Tennessee in supporting its holding
stated: “Courts have approved of the use of statistical sampling
and extrapolation where an individualized claim-by-claim-review
of the elements in a case would be unfeasible or extremely costly
131

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595.
Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 2014 WL 4816006, at *2.
133
Id. at *1. The federal government presented the following arguments in
support of Dr. Yiannoutsos’s testimony, as applied to the Daubert standards:
[T]he Government’s use of sampling is limited to the number of claims for
non-covered services and the loss associated with those claims;
(2) Defendant’s arguments about representativeness are unsupported by
statistics, law or logic; (3) a probe sample is not necessary to develop a
statistically valid sample; (4) any arguments about issues with the medical
review should be directed at the medical review rather than the sample
design; and (5) Dr. Yiannoutsos’[s] testimony is supported by well-accepted
statistical methods.
Id. at *13.
134
Brief for United States at 1, United States ex rel. Martin v. Life Care Centers
of America, Inc., No. 1:08-CV-00251, 2014 WL 4816006 2014 WL 5359287 (E.D.
Tenn. Mar. 21, 2014).
132
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and where the challenging party is afforded an opportunity to
rebut the results.”135 The court held that the defendants’ due
process rights were satisfied because they had the opportunity to
cross examine the plaintiff’s expert statistician, and offer
competing evidence.136
In making this ultimate conclusion, the Eastern District of
Tennessee has opened doors for False Claims Act plaintiffs which
were otherwise closed—it has expanded the scope of acceptable
usage of statistical sampling, without much consideration of the
extensive precedent holding otherwise, in such a way that could
dramatically affect the future of False Claims Act litigation.137
5.

United States ex rel. Michaels v. Agape Senior Community,
Inc.138—Undoing What Life Care Undid

A year after the decision in Life Care, the District of South
Carolina, in United States ex rel. Michaels v. Agape Senior
Community Inc., also considered, but rejected, the use of
statistical sampling to determine liability in False Claims Act
cases. In this case, which was a qui tam, and where the claims
alleged were “fact-dependent and wholly unrelated to each and
every other claim,”139 the parties on both sides agreed to a
bellwether analysis.140 This is a specific form of statistical
sampling whereby a sample of cases “large enough to yield
reliable results is tried to a jury.”141 The federal government
ultimately rejected this methodology, despite the parties’ mutual
agreement to use statistical sampling, claiming that the results
were inaccurate, with an “error rate” of 20–60%.142
The court acknowledged the obvious difficulty of
demonstrating liability for each individual claim, considering the
sheer volume of claims; and it recognized that quite often, as in
United States ex rel. Michaels, the plaintiffs must hire experts

135
Id. at 6. The defendants took the opportunity to rebut this evidence at trial
by contesting the method and accuracy of the statistical analysis. They were not able
to contest the apparent falseness of each individual alleged false claim.
136
Markey & Sarola, supra note 74.
137
False Claims Act—Proof of Liability, supra note 73.
138
No. 0:12-3466-JFA, 2015 WL 3903675 (D. S.C. June 25, 2015).
139
Id. at *2.
140
Id.
141
Id.
142
Id.
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who review each individual claim.143 In United States ex rel.
Michaels, it was necessary for the plaintiff-relators to pay $400
an hour for file review to experts who spent 4 to 9 hours
reviewing each individual claim, in a case where over fifty
thousand false claims were alleged.144 The expense of such an
exercise is likely a disincentive for plaintiffs who would otherwise
pursue their cases all the way through to trial. However, the
District of South Carolina’s ultimate ruling, even after
considering and citing the decision in Life Care, was that these
claims are intrinsically fact specific, and as a result, these cases
are simply not “suited for statistical sampling.”145 The court also
highlighted the fact that the evidence necessary to prove liability
for each individual claim, the patients’ medical charts, was
“intact and available for review by either party.”146
The
government’s interest in ensuring an accurate and fair outcome
was so strong in this case that it superseded any interest in
expediting the procedural process whereby liability was
determined—so much so that the government decided to
intervene in a qui tam case to rectify the bad outcome brought
about by statistical sampling.
The conflicting outcomes of these cases underscore the
struggle of balancing the interests of the federal government in
facilitating recovery of fraudulently disbursed funds under the
False Claims Act and the public’s interest in preserving
defendants’ due process rights.
III. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS APPLIED TO
STATISTICAL SAMPLING
Most scholarship regarding the acceptability of sampling as
a tool for adjudication of mass litigations diverges based upon
two analytical theories. Some argue that sampling allows for the
efficient adjudication of these large cases, where courts are faced
with the enormous task of adjudicating claims numbering in the
thousands, if not hundreds of thousands. Others argue that

143
144
145
146

Id. at *1.
Id.
Id. at *8.
Id. at *7.
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sampling, though it may “maximize utility,” obstructs justice by
bypassing the procedural safeguards necessary for the protection
of defendants’ right to Due Process.147
Representing the former school of thought, in his article
regarding the use of sampling in class action litigation, Hillel
Bavli argues that sampling is an acceptable method to determine
liability so long as the outcome of the sampling is accurate.148 So
long as the ends are just, Bavli argues, the means by which those
ends are achieved—that is, statistical sampling—will be
acceptable, despite the misgivings expressed by judges, in a
number of cases, who rejected statistical sampling in the interest
of protecting defendants’ due process rights.149
Defending the latter school of thought, and employing a
rights-based, rather than utility-based, understanding of mass
litigation, Robert Bone argues in Statistical Adjudication that a
“rights-based theory assumes that the purpose of adjudication
is,” also, “to determine each party’s legal rights accurately.”150
The proponents of this theory assert that sampling is a flawed
methodology, which does not guarantee accurate results, and so
it should not be accepted as an appropriate alternative for
evidentiary analysis in mass litigations.151
While each of these theories justifies or refutes statistical
sampling based on the perceived accuracy or inaccuracy of the
outcomes derived from statistical analysis,152 the apparent
accuracy or inaccuracy of the outcome should not overshadow or
discount the importance of the means by which those outcomes
are achieved. The methodology that allows the court to arrive at
a particular result must conform to constitutional requirements,
and should it fail to meet those requirements, then that
methodology should be retooled or replaced.
Courts risk arbitrarily depriving defendants of their property
when they use statistical sampling to determine liability in False
Claims Act cases, and so statistical sampling affords defendants
insufficient process under the Mathews v. Eldridge test and
147

Bone, supra note 106, at 594.
Hillel J. Bavli, Aggregating for Accuracy: A Closer Look at Sampling and
Accuracy in Class Action Litigation, 14 L. PROBABILITY & RISK 1, 3 (2015).
149
Id. at 2–3.
150
Bone, supra note 106, at 598.
151
Id.
152
See Vern R. Walker, Restoring the Individual Plaintiff to Tort Law by
Rejecting “Junk Logic” About Specific Causation, 56 ALA. L. REV. 381, 390 (2004).
148
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should not be used to determine liability.153 There are several
factors that must be considered to determine whether the
modification of procedures in a trial—for instance, the adoption
of statistical sampling rather than proving individual liability for
each claim154—deprives defendants of their right to due process.
In Mathews v. Eldridge, the United States Supreme Court listed
several criteria for making this determination.155 First, the Court
considers “the private interest that will be affected” by the
procedure; second, it examines “the risk of an erroneous
deprivation” through the procedures under attack and the
“probable value” of additional or alternative safeguards; and
third, principal attention is given to the interest of the party
seeking the procedure, with, nonetheless, due regard for any
ancillary interest the government may have in providing the
procedure or forgoing the added burden of providing greater
protection.156
A.

Defendants Have Substantial Property Interests That Are at
Stake in False Claims Act Litigations

First, the private interest that is affected by the use of
statistical sampling is easily discernible in False Claims Act
cases. There is an obvious property interest at stake: The money
that may be recovered from the defendants, which may number
in the hundreds of millions of dollars,157 and the False Claims Act
also permits the government to collect treble damages.158 There
may even be a liberty interest at stake159—a ruling against the
defendant may result in not only reputational harm to the
153

See generally Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
Christopher J. Roche, Note, A Litigation Association Model To Aggregate
Mass Tort Claims for Adjudication, 91 VA. L. REV. 1463, 1507 (2005).
155
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
156
Id.
157
Record Year for False Claims Act Recoveries, TAXPAYERS AGAINST FRAUD
EDUC.
FUND,
http://www.taf.org/press-releases/record-year-false-claims-actrecoveries (last visited Jan. 12, 2017).
158
LaSalle, supra note 14, at 522.
159
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976). The “stigma” plus test is derived
from Paul v. Davis. Reputation alone is not a constitutionally protected liberty
interest. Id. Instead, there needs to be some right or status, which was previously
recognized by state law, that was altered or extinguished—for example, loss of
employment opportunities. Id. In the context of False Claims Act cases, the impact
to the company’s reputation following a finding of fraud, together with the rescission
of government contracts, or the future inability to contract with the government,
may be sufficient to establish a liberty interest.
154
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company, but the defendants may also lose the “ability to
contract with the government.”160 These are substantial interests
and merit substantial procedural safeguards so that defendants
may not be arbitrarily deprived of these interests.
B.

Statistical Sampling Increases the Risk of Erroneous
Deprivation of Defendant’s Property

Second, with statistical sampling, the risk of erroneous
deprivation of property is great. Statistical sampling is not
necessarily a reliable or accurate means of determining whether
each of the alleged claims satisfies the requisite elements of the
False Claims Act cause of action. The factors that courts
generally consider when measuring the risk of erroneous
deprivation include the accuracy, fairness, and reliability of the
outcomes of the procedure.161 By allowing plaintiffs to present a
statistical analysis of a sample, rather than undergoing
evidentiary analysis of each alleged claim, the courts essentially
lower the standard of proof for False Claims Act cases, and,
consequently, heighten the risk of erroneous deprivation.162
1.

Methodological Flaws of Statistical Sampling

Statistical sampling has been enthusiastically approved as a
prospective alternative to individualized assessments of each
claim asserted in other types of mass litigation.163 However, so

160
LaSalle, supra note 14, at 521, 523–24 (“There is a significant possibility that
a contractor or health care provider will lose its ability to contract with the
government if a False Claims Suit is successfully brought. Particularly in the health
care field, the most substantial threat of any investigation is the possibility of
exclusion—‘the death penalty for health care providers.’ ”).
161
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 343.
162
See Kirby D. Behre & A. Jeff Ifrah, Statisticians at DOJ May Overstate Case,
21 NAT’L L. 22, 22 (1999).
163
Mass litigation involves “numerous similar claims,” which “[number] in the
tens of thousands.” Some common examples of mass litigations include mass torts,
product defects, antitrust conspiracy, securities fraud, and more. David Rosenberg,
New Approaches for a Safer and Healthier Society: A Sampling-Based System of
Civil Liability, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 635, 638 (2014). The use of statistical
sampling has long been promulgated within the context of mass tort litigations
because the encumbrance of litigating each claim individually, and offering adequate
evidence for each claim, is so great that plaintiffs are often “preclude[ed]” from
“trying cases.” Roche, supra note 154, at 1502. Indeed, in the context of such mass
litigations, courts are now far more accepting of statistical sampling than perhaps
ever before: Statistical sampling is “a well-accepted alternative for the trial judge
facing crippling discovery and evidentiary costs.” Id. (citing In re Simon II Litig., 211
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long as there is doubt as to the reliability and validity of its
results, in the context of the False Claims Act, it is not a just
alternative. This methodology is inherently flawed in a number
of ways. There is little uniformity in the application of statistical
sampling; experts disagree about which methodology to use, the
means by which a sample is selected, the size of the sample, and
whether it is even appropriate to use sampling as a means to
“cut-off discovery or merely [to] shift costs.”164
First, there are various techniques for statistical sampling,
and statisticians disagree as to which techniques are most
effective, as well as the problems each technique presents.165
Moreover, statisticians recognize that their own analyses may
bring about inaccurate results. For instance, in the United
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts case
United States ex rel. Loughren v. UnumProvident Corp.,166 the
court rejected sampling for the determination of liability.167 The
plaintiffs presented the testimony of their expert witness, who
elected to use cohort sampling, as opposed to random sampling or
stratified sampling, which are more familiar to most lawyers and
judges.168 Upon presenting the results of his initial analysis, the
plaintiff’s expert was heavily criticized by the defendant’s expert,
so much so that the plaintiff actually accounted for the

F.R.D. 86, 149 (E.D.N.Y. 2002), vacated, remanded on other grounds, 407 F.3d 125
(2d Cir. 2005)).
164
Yablon & Landsman-Roos, supra note 34, at 724. “The Federal Rules provide
no guidance on any of these matters and the discussion of these issues in the cases
themselves is limited.” Id. at 723.
165
Random sampling is most commonly used, but its results are unreliable
unless the population from which the sample is drawn is homogeneous. On the other
hand, while stratified sampling accounts for the differences in characteristics
possessed by individual claims in the entire population, the stratifications are not
guaranteed to create uniform bodies of claims. Moreover, the “confidence interval”
for stratified sampling is lower. JOSEPH L. GASTWIRTH, STATISTICAL SCIENCE IN THE
COURTROOM 410 (2000).
166
604 F. Supp. 2d 259 (D. Mass. 2009).
167
Id. at 269.
168
Id. at 261; see also Yale Department of Statistics, Sampling, http://www.stat.
yale.edu/Courses/1997-98/101/sample.htm (“Simple random sampling is the basic
sampling technique where we select a group of subjects (a sample) for study from a
larger group (a population). Each individual is chosen entirely by chance and each
member of the population has an equal chance of being included in the sample.
Every possible sample of a given size has the same chance of selection.”).
Id. Stratified random sampling, on the other hand, is “generally used when the
population is heterogeneous, or dissimilar, where certain homogeneous, or similar,
sub-populations can be isolated (strata).” Id.
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defendant’s expert’s criticism and incorporated his suggestions
into his analysis.169 Ultimately, the court held that the results of
the plaintiff’s expert were flawed, as a result of his flawed
method of statistical analysis.170 Because the plaintiff was
unable to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
its expert’s testimony was reliable, the court determined that
extrapolating liability from its expert’s sample was
inappropriate.171
Second, if any elements of a claim are unaccounted for in the
sample, the outcome of a statistical analysis is not likely to be
accurate.172 Ultimately, a finding of liability in a False Claims
Act case requires the plaintiff to prove that the claims were both
fraudulent and that the defendant has the requisite intent—facts
proving these elements are not captured in a statistical
sample.173
In his article regarding individualized determinations of
liability in mass tort cases, Vern Walker argues that the
classification of claims for the purpose of defining a sample is a
major source of error in statistical analysis. The extrapolation of
data from a statistical analysis of a sample, or group, that is
incorrectly classified, and the eventual drawing of inferences
from an initial faulty premise, “may result in erroneous
conclusions about groups of individuals.”174
169

Loughren, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 263.
Id. at 269.
171
Id.
172
Peter Simon, Pros and Cons of Statistical Sampling, LAW360 (Mar. 22, 2011),
http://www.law360.com/articles/232125/pros-and-cons-of-statistical-sampling (“In a
construction case involving defective windows installed in a new housing
development, the plaintiff hired an expert who identified all the windows that
readily showed signs of defect, and examined a random sample of these windows.
The expert then extrapolated his results to all windows, not just those with signs of
defect. This was inappropriate, because the sample included only the windows that
were known to (very likely) be defective. Extrapolation to the entire population
overstated the true rate of defect among windows.”).
173
GASTWIRTH, supra note 165.
174
Walker, supra note 152; see also Michael J. Saks & Peter David Blanck,
Justice Improved: The Unrecognized Benefits of Aggregation and Sampling in the
Trial of Mass Torts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 815, 837 (1992) (“The more heterogeneous the
subgroups, the greater the error involved. Either the subgroups need to be composed
of sufficiently similar cases to insure reduction rather than magnification of error, or
the plaintiffs would have to waive their right to more accurate determinations.”). In
their article defending statistical sampling’s application in mass tort cases, Saks and
Blanck argued that statistical sampling produces both reliable and valid results
when the following criteria are satisfied: (1) the cases in the population are identical,
170
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Third, as Judge Richard Posner explained in An Economic
Approach to the Law of Evidence, the use of statistical sampling
to determine liability at trial may be problematic because jurors
could misunderstand the math and its application to the facts.175
Judge Posner cited the work of Ronald Allen, who argued that:
[T]he standard burden of proof instruction to a jury in a civil
case . . . will often imply that the jury should find in favor of the
plaintiff even if the probability that his claim is valid is much
less than .5. The jury will be instructed to render a verdict for
the plaintiff if it is satisfied that he has proved each of the
elements of his claim by a preponderance of the evidence even if
the elements are independent that is, their probabilities are
uncorrelated. It is as if the court were telling the jury, that as
soon as it finds one element proved by a preponderance of the
evidence, it should assume that that element has been proved to
a certainty. In other words, the jurors are being told to be bad
mathematicians!176

The results of an analysis of a nonrepresentative sample may be
mistakenly interpreted by the jury as proof of all elements of the
claim. This failure to sufficiently review evidence supporting
each element of the claim—that is, falsity and intent and the
actual submission of false claims for reimbursement—could very
well result in a ruling against the defendants, and the erroneous
deprivation of their property.
Finally, in cases where parties have challenged the sample
size that is selected for analysis, it is generally required that the
parties “retain an expert statistician to explain, both at the
investigative stage and at an administrative hearing or a trial,

and “perfectly homogeneous with respect to damage-related variables”; (2) the cases
are, in fact, so similar, that repeating an analysis of a single case 100 times would
have substantially the same result if 100 different cases were analyzed; (3) the
average of sample verdicts “more closely” [approximates] the correct damages figure
for any case in the population than the verdict from an individual trial of that case;
and (4) even if the population is not comprised of identical claims, if “the variation is
not too great and the sample size is large enough,” the outcome is still likely to be
accurate. Id. at 833–37; Bone, supra note 106, at 578. The likelihood that parties to a
False Claims Act litigation will be able to determine, with any certitude, that each of
the claims presented is essentially “identical” is very low; consequently, this
methodology’s usefulness is correspondingly unlikely.
175
Richard Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L.
REV. 1477, 1512 (1999).
176
Id.
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why the sample size is statistically inadequate.”177 For instance,
in Michigan Department of Education v. United States
Department of Education, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit held that a sample size of .4% of the total
population was acceptable, in contravention of an earlier holding
in the Middle District of Florida, Daytona Beach General
Hospital v. Weinberger, where a 10% sample was deemed too
small to achieve an accurate result.178
Statistical sampling is therefore an unpredictable and
unreliable methodology, and so the risk of erroneous deprivation
is correspondingly high. This methodology is not a valid means
to determine the merits of a False Claims Act case.
2.

Statistical Sampling and the De Facto Reduction of the
Burden of Proof

Under this second prong of the Mathews v. Eldridge test, it is
necessary to examine the “sufficiency of the current procedures,
and the availability of alternative or substitute procedures.”179
When the burden of proof for False Claims Act cases was reduced
from the “clear and convincing” evidence standard to the
“preponderance of the evidence” standard, Frank LaSalle argued
in The Civil False Claims Act: The Need for a Heightened Burden
of Proof as a Prerequisite for Forfeiture, that the penalty imposed
on those who are judged to have violated the False Claims Act is
“quasi-criminal,” and so defendants are entitled to a more
strenuous review of the plaintiffs’ allegations than the new
standard of proof affords them.180 The use of statistical sampling
reduces the standard of proof even further.181
177
Jack R. Bierig, Note, Methodological Challenges to Government Sampling
Techniques in Civil Fraud and Abuse Cases, 32 J. HEALTH L. 339 (1999).
178
Id. The difference in holdings was rationalized by the fact that the defendant
in the former was “given every opportunity to challenge” the sample size and the
“technique” by which the sample was evaluated.
179
LaSalle, supra note 14, at 526.
180
Id. at 527, 529.
181
Statistical sampling was deemed permissible for the calculation of damages
by the United States Supreme Court in 1927 in Eastman Kodak Co. of N.Y. v, S.
Photo Materials Co., where liability had already been established. 273 U.S. 359, 379
(1927). In Story Parchment Co. v. Patterson Parchment Paper Co., the Supreme
Court judged that the proof requirement for liability exceeds the proof requirement
for damages. 282 U.S. 555, 562 (1931). Even in mass tort cases, in order to
determine liability, the burden of proof is the preponderance of the evidence—a
different standard than that used to determine damages. Walker, supra note 152, at
460.
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Statistical sampling, as a means of evidentiary analysis for
the purpose of proving liability, is simply insufficient to protect
defendants’ property interests. The “more severe the sanction,
the more procedure must protect against sanctioning of the
innocent, and . . . the more it must protect the accused’s dignity
and privacy.”182 In cases where statistical analysis would be used
to determine defendants’ liability, defendants are vulnerable—
the methodology whereby liability is determined may be, as
discussed in the previous section, flawed—and defendants are
denied the opportunity to defend themselves against each
individual claim of fraud.183 Consequently, the defendants:
[S]tand to lose a tremendous amount of money, disproportionate
to the actual harm they caused and potentially their ability to
participate in government programs. . . . Also, both parties
involved are not private, but rather the Government is
prosecuting the case. When the Government is a party to an
action, there is an increased risk of error due to the disparity in
resources and options available to the Government vis a vis the
defendant.184

Statistical sampling enables the plaintiffs to bypass individual
examinations of each claim, and effectively denies defendants the
opportunity to challenge those claims. While the plaintiffs
benefit from doing less work and achieving more favorable
outcomes, the risk of erroneous deprivation of the defendants’
property increases.
3.

Sampling’s Implications for Defendants’ Seventh
Amendment Rights

Other process-related concerns regarding statistical
sampling include what some have described as “[stripping]
adjudication of . . . its most essential attribute—a trial of factual
and legal issues in the context of an individual dispute.”185 A
common argument in opposition to the adoption of statistical
sampling to determine liability is that statistical sampling
deprives defendants of their Seventh Amendment right to a trial
182

LaSalle, supra note 14, at 530.
Saks & Blanck, supra note 174, at 838 (“[A]lthough all defendants would
have an opportunity to present their evidence and arguments, they would not get to
do so in response to every plaintiff, but only to a sample of them.”).
184
LaSalle, supra note 14, at 531.
185
Bone, supra note 106, at 617–18 (quoting In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d
706, 712 (5th Cir. 1990)).
183
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by jury.186 Defendants’ rights are abrogated under the Seventh
Amendment when courts fail to consider individual evidence
from each claim before the jury.187 In Bigelow v. RKO Radio
Pictures, Inc., the court held that “the jury may not render a
verdict based on speculation or guesswork.”188 Instead, as in In
re Vioxx, a products liability litigation, courts insist that the
defendants’ Seventh Amendment rights supersede plaintiffs’
interest in efficiency. Courts have declined to apply statistical
sampling in other litigation contexts, including products liability
litigation, where judges were unconvinced that the use of
sampling did not deprive defendants of their Seventh
Amendment rights.189
4.

Statistical Sampling and Specificity of Pleading
Requirements

The use of statistical sampling also circumvents another
crucial step of the False Claims Act adjudicatory process—or of
any litigation, for that matter. To present a cognizable claim,
under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff
must present an issue that is supported by enough facts to defeat
a motion for summary judgment—the facts must be specific
enough to demonstrate that there is a justiciable issue.190
Various circuit courts differ as to what degree of specificity
must be alleged in plaintiffs’ complaints to successfully initiate
litigation on a False Claims Act claim. The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure provide, in Rule 8, that a party which submits its
pleading to the court must include “a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”191
Additionally, each allegation should be expressed in a manner
which is “simple, concise, and direct.”192 Of particular interest is
the requirement under Rule 9(b)—if fraud or mistake is alleged
in the pleading, “the circumstances constituting such fraud or

186
187
188
189
190
191
192

Roche, supra note 154, at 1508–09.
Id.
Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264 (1946).
Trapani, supra note 102, at 2522.
FED. R. CIV. P. 8.
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(d).
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mistake must be stated with ‘particularity.’ ”193 On the one hand,
the First Circuit and the Seventh Circuit have held that the
plaintiffs need not enumerate specific false claims to meet the
9(b) pleading standard—and so, perhaps, statistical sampling
would be deemed sufficient at this stage.194 On the other hand,
the Fifth, Eleventh, Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have
concluded that plaintiffs do need to allege specific false claims.195
These conflicting holdings challenge those who would offer up
statistical sampling as an alternative to individually proven and
argued claims as evidence at trial.
Still, the requirement of specificity is a mandate that was
imposed for the purpose of protecting the due process rights of
the defendants.196 This requirement also protects defendants
from prosecutors conducting witch-hunts, claiming fraud without
any factual basis and then fishing around for evidence to support
that conclusion, after the defendants have already suffered the
risks that accompany a finding of liability.197 Since courts are
unable to conclude that statistical sampling presents sufficient

193
Barney J. Finberg, Construction and Application of Provision of Rule 9(b),
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, That Circumstances Constituting Fraud or Mistake
be Stated with Particularity, 27 AM. L. REP. FED. 407, § 2a (1976).
194
See, e.g., United States ex rel. Duxbury v. Ortho Biotech Prods., L.P., 579
F.3d 13, 29 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding that a relator could satisfy Rule 9(b) by providing
factual or statistical evidence to strengthen the inference of fraud beyond possibility
without necessarily providing details as to each claim); United States ex rel. Lusby v.
Rolls-Royce Corp. 570 F.3d 849, 854 (7th Cir. 2009).
195
See, e.g., Hopper v. Solvay Pharms., Inc., 588 F.3d 1318, 1325 (11th Cir.
2009) (holding that an allegation of fraud under the False Claims Act must meet the
heightened pleading standard of 9(b), which should be applied and enforced
predictably and reliably: if “Rule 9(b) is to carry any water, it must mean that an
essential allegation and circumstance of fraudulent conduct cannot be alleged in
such conclusory fashion” (quoting United States ex rel. Clausen v. Lab. Corp. of Am.,
290 F.3d 1301, 1313 (11th Cir. 2002))); Sanderson v. HCA-The Healthcare Co., 447
F.3d 873, 877 (6th Cir. 2006); United States ex rel. Sikkenga v. Regence Bluecross
Blueshield of Utah, 472 F.3d 702, 728 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that complaints
alleging false claims must be based on facts, and not “speculation and conclusory
allegations”); United States ex rel. Spicer v. Westbrook, 751 F.3d 354, 365 (5th Cir.
2014); United States ex rel. Vigil v. Nelnet, Inc., 639 F.3d 791, 796 (8th Cir. 2010).
196
“To satisfy the particularity requirement in pleading fraud, the pleader must
set out the time, place, and content of the alleged misrepresentation with
specificity.” Finberg, supra note 193, ¶ 2a. Furthermore, the defendant requires
notice so that he: (1) may be able “to prepare meaningful responses”; (2) “to preclude
the use of a groundless fraud claim as a pretext to discovering a wrong”; and (3) “to
safeguard defendants from frivolous charges which might damage their
reputations.” Id.
197
Id.
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evidence at the pleadings stage, they surely cannot conclude that
statistical sampling provides enough factual evidence to justify a
determination of liability, and the grave consequences a finding
of liability entails.
C.

Balancing of Interests—Efficiency Versus Due Process Rights

Under the third prong of the Mathews v. Eldridge test, the
federal government clearly has a compelling interest in enforcing
the False Claims Act more vigorously, because it will then be
able to recover even more wrongfully disbursed federal funds.
But these ends do not justify using statistical sampling as the
means. The requirement of individually pleading each claim is a
burden the government would be grateful to bypass in the
interest of efficiency. Still, the loss risked by defendants if of
substantial value, such that the defendant ought to be entitled to
all of the protections of a civil trial’s procedural requirements
before it is deprived of that value.
Admittedly, in other contexts, the government’s interests in
efficiency and expedience have won out over adjudications over
individual clams.198 In mass tort cases, for example, arriving at a
settlement occurs through a process akin to sampling—“[b]oth
procedures extrapolate from a subset of cases to generate
outcomes for all cases in the larger population.”199 The use of
statistical sampling has long been promulgated within the
context of mass tort litigations, because the encumbrance of
litigating each claim individually, and offering adequate evidence
for each claim, is so great that plaintiffs are often “preclude[d]”
from “trying cases.”200 So, too, in class action litigations—in
Hilao v. Estate of Marcos,201 the Ninth Circuit allowed
compensatory damages for 9,541 class members to be calculated
using a random sample of 137 claims, and the court extrapolated
the validity and value of the sample set to the remaining

198
Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Sampling Liability, 85 VA. L. REV. 329,
343 (1999) (“Individualized information should be used where it is practical—i.e.,
cost effective—to obtain. If individual information is not practical to obtain, however,
sampling should be used so that a judgment can be reached efficiently and
expeditiously.”).
199
Bone, supra note 106, at 574.
200
Roche, supra note 154, at 1502.
201
103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996).

FINAL_VLAHOS

848

2/14/2017 11:02 PM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:813

claims.202 The court in that case also considered the difficulty of
adjudicating nearly 10,000 claims individually to determine the
defendant’s liability and determined that some degree of
accuracy in the outcome was justifiably sacrificed in the interest
of efficiently determining the claims’ outcome.203
Indeed, in the context of such mass litigations, courts are
now far more accepting of statistical sampling than perhaps ever
before—statistical sampling is “a well-accepted alternative for
the trial judge facing crippling discovery and evidentiary
costs.”204 However, as discussed in the foregoing sections, when
the competing interests at stake are administrative efficiency on
the one hand, and protecting defendants’ due process rights on
the other, as is the case in False Claims Act matters, the latter
must always prevail.
CONCLUSION
Statistical sampling is not an appropriate tool for litigating
liability in False Claims Act cases. It deprives defendants of
their Due Process rights under the Fifth Amendment, by
depriving them of property without providing them with the
opportunity to defend themselves against a finding of liability for
each individual claim alleged. Statistical sampling enables
plaintiffs, including qui tam relators and the federal government,
to circumvent their burden of proof, including the burden of
providing evidence of each element of a False Claims Act claim.
Though statistical sampling certainly presents a means of
saving time and resources for plaintiffs bringing False Claims
Act cases, and its use would facilitate False Claims Act
enforcement, and, consequently, the recovery of more assets for
202
Id. at 782–87. The use of sampling in this case was ultimately approved
because of the caution the plaintiffs exercised in completing their statistical
analysis—the thousands of claims were divided into smaller groups based on shared
characteristics, and the analysis was completed across those groups, accounting for
those differences. Id. at 785.
203
Id. at 786.
204
Roche, supra note 154, at 1502. This alternative was adopted for the
litigation of asbestos-related injuries in Cimino v. Raymark Industries, Inc., where
the District Court judge allowed a sample of 160 claims to be analyzed to determine
the damages to be awarded to each member of a full class of 2,298 claims. 751 F.
Supp. 649, 653 (E.D. Tex. 1990), rev’d, 151 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 1998). This technique
was eventually rejected by the Fifth Circuit, which held that the defendant was
entitled to a jury trial on each individual claim to determine damages. Id. at 319
(5th Cir. 1998).
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the federal government, these benefits should not be provided at
the expense of defendants’ due process rights under the
Constitution.

